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and Black Diasporas in Latin America 
 
 
Abstract 
The globalized Western culture of innovation, as propagated by major aid institutions, 
does not necessarily lead to empowerment or improvement of the well-being of the stake-
holders. On the contrary, it often blocks viable indigenous innovation cultures. In African 
societies and African Diasporas in Latin America, cultures of innovation largely accrue 
from the informal, not the formal sector. Crucial for their proper understanding is a three-
fold structural differentiation: between the formal and informal sector, within the informal 
sector, according to class, gender or religion, and between different transnational social 
spaces. Different innovation cultures may be complementary, mutually reinforcing, or 
conflicting, leading in extreme cases even to a ‘clash of cultures’ at the local level. The re-
percussions of competing, even antagonistic agencies of innovative strategic groups are 
demonstrated, analyzing the case of the African poor in Benin and the African Diasporas 
of Brazil and Haiti.  
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Zusammenfassung  
Innovationskulturen der Armen in Afrika 
Die globalisierte westliche Innovationskultur, wie sie von den großen Entwicklungshilfe-
institutionen propagiert wird, führt nicht notwendigerweise zur Verbesserung der Le-
bensbedingungen der Armen. Sie blockiert im Gegenteil oft wertvolle Ansätze endogener 
kultureller Innovationen. In afrikanischen Gesellschaften und in der Afrikanischen Dias-
pora Lateinamerikas entstehen Innovationskulturen überwiegend im informellen, nicht im 
formellen Sektor. Diese Innovationskulturen weisen eine dreifache strukturelle Differen-
zierung auf: zwischen formellem und informellem Sektor, innerhalb des informellen ge-
mäß sozialer Schichtung, Geschlecht oder Religion sowie zwischen transnationalen sozia-
len Räumen. Diese unterschiedlichen Innovationskulturen können sich gegenseitig ergän-
zen und verstärken oder aber auch bekämpfen, was in Extremfällen bis hin zum „Kampf 
der Kulturen“ auf lokaler Ebene führt. Die Auswirkungen dieser konkurrierenden oder 
antagonistischen Handlungsstrategien innovativer strategischer Gruppen werden an 
Hand von Fallstudien der Armen in Benin und in der Afrikanischen Diaspora Brasiliens 
und Haitis aufgezeigt.  
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1. On the Concept of Cultures of Innovation  
The advancement of our knowledge about cultural change and development is considerable, 
but the 'white spots' in our cognitive map grow even faster1. Outdated hypotheses about 
“monocultural” readings of a nation’s past or about cultural determinism, which were con-
sidered inspiring truth (e.g. about the impact of the protestant ethic on the growth of Euro-
pean capitalism), turned out to be heroic oversimplifications of little prognostic value (cf. 
Sen 2002:6, 10-13). Nevertheless, they remain cherished by many individuals and social 
groups (including development experts), not least, because they bolster the self-assurance 
and provide ready made concepts in distinguishing between social peers and strangers. 
                                                     
1  This paper was presented at the 16th ISA World Congress of Sociology, Durban/South Africa, July 
23-29, 2006, Research Committee 09 – Social Transformations and Sociology of Development, Ses-
sion 02: Global Modernity, Civilizations and Local Life-Worlds (Part II). An earlier version was de-
livered to the INST – International Conference on: Innovations and Reproductions in Cultures and So-
cieties (IRICS), Vienna, December 9-11, 2005. Thanks for valuable suggestions go to the participants 
of the conferences mentioned above, and to my colleagues at the GIGA, notably Gilberto Calcag-
notto, Wolfgang Hein, Steffen Trede and Janina Dill. The responsibility for any fallacies or inaccu-
racies in the paper remains of course with the author. 
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Stimulated by Max Weber’s enlightening thesis on the protestant ethic as the spirit of Euro-
pean capitalist development, generations of social scientists searched for cultural innova-
tions which could promote economic growth in developing countries (LDCs)2. Although a 
tendency still prevails to underrate the role of culture and spirituality in development, nota-
bly among economists and development experts, there is a consensus in social science that 
culture matters3. The question is rather: What constitutes the decisive element of culture in 
relation to development, and how does culture matter (cf. Sen 2004)?  
Culture is not inherently good or bad, a simple truth which, however, has to be underlined 
time and again in view of fashionable but questionable theses on the ‘clash of cultures’ and 
‘axes of evil’. Yet, under certain conditions its propensity to change and influence perceptions 
of power and values can lead to considerable improvements in general well being (cf. 
Rao/Walton 2004:1). However, recurring patterns and processes of cultural change and devel-
opment should not cloud essential differences of innovation processes in different countries 
and cultures. Besides, neither the influence of civil society nor of transnational social spaces on 
culture and development are necessarily constructive (cf. Ikelegbe 2001; Ukiwo 2003). 
The fundamental ambivalence of the impact of culture renders its analysis tricky and par-
ticularly stimulating at the same time. Yet, it would be premature to look for solutions in 
ready-made concepts, and to jump from the recognition of the multiple interacting processes 
of cultural change and development to one-dimensional theories on the linkage between 
culture and economic growth or, even more so, to cultural determinism4. As convincing as 
these theories may have appeared on an heuristic level at the time of their conception, in 
retrospect, taking into account the evolution of the history of science, they have hardly ever 
proven to be sound scientific reasoning, as argued by Amartya Sen (2002:9-17) in a lucid 
excurse on the history of failed approaches from Max Weber to Huntington.  
                                                     
2  Cf. Weber (1904/2002). For an overview on the vast body of literature on development and cultural 
change cf. Rao/Walton 2004; Sen 2002; Douglas 2002; Faschingeder 2001; 2003; Inglehart/Baker 
2000; Bliss et al. 1997; Elwert 1996; Müller 1996; Schönhuth 1991; for current views of African 
scholars on this question cf. Odhiambo 2002; Masolo 1994; 2003; Soyinka 1994. 
3  There exist several – sometimes contradicting – definitions of culture and development in social 
science (cf. Elwert 1996:51-58). Albeit not too broad, our definition of culture should be sufficiently 
abstract to include all aspects, relevant in relation to our subject, therefore I hold with the general 
approaches of Rao/Walton (2004), who regard culture as “those aspects of life that facilitate the 
comprehension of relationships between individuals, between groups, between ideas and between 
perspectives.” and Mary Douglas (2002:3): “Culture is a dynamically interactive and developing 
socio-psychic system. At any point in time the culture of a community is engaged in a joint pro-
duction of meaning.” In short, culture has to be recognized as “non-homogeneous, non-static, and 
interactive”, otherwise cultural prejudice and determinism easily lend themselves to cultural big-
otry, alienation, political tyranny and doubtful theories (cf. Sen 2002:8-13).  
4  Ronald Inglehart can be considered a leading proponent of the latter.– For a critique cf. 
Rao/Walton 2002:18-24; Sen 2002:20. 
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Unfortunately, both the quest for an export of growth inducing cultural essentials, and the 
transfer of globalized concepts of structural adjustment, as pushed by international donors 
during the 1980s, failed. In the light of global triumph of capitalism the latter became a relig-
ion in itself for many of its adherents and promoters, including economists and develop-
ment experts5. Pre-conceived ideas which might have worked within the European cultural 
setting did not act up in the face of the socio-cultural heritage of African societies, neither 
did the opposite, the idealization of “traditional African cultures” by European ethno-
philosophers6. For our purpose, however, it is important to take into account the diversity of 
mutually competitive systems within any given culture. This includes a wide range of mar-
ginal practices and value-systems, which is often hidden behind the visible characteristics of 
a dominant culture. The exploration of them would require new approaches, methods and 
an important shift in the current scientific paradigms (cf. Hountondji 2001:13). 
A holistic understanding of the linkage between culture and development as delimitated 
above is the underlying rational of the concept of ‘cultures of innovation’ developed and 
applied by the UNESCO (2004) and scholars as D’Orville (2004) and others (cf. Wieland 
2004; Abele et al. 2001; Barber 2004; Beaver 2004; Heidenreich 2001; Herbig 1994). According 
to Heidenreich’s definition ‘cultures of innovation’ are relatively stable modes of reflection, 
behavior and social organization, directed towards ‘modernization’ or ‘development’. They 
are often based on shared values and fulfill important roles of orientation, motivation, coor-
dination, and legitimization, concerning the actual performance of innovation processes. 
Therefore, their investigation enhances the quality of prognosis of social actions (cf. Heiden-
reich 2001: chap. 1).  
Today as in the past, cultures of innovation have existed not only in industrialized countries, 
but in nearly every region of the world. However, there is no passepartout of cultural 
change, but cultures of innovation depend on space, time and context specific frameworks. 
In short, they are a significant part of multiple modernities7 and development oriented proc-
esses of socialization, influenced by globalization and transnational social spaces (cf. Cal-
laghy et al. 2001; Pries 2001; Robertson 1995; Sassen 1999; Ferguson 2005). Instead of propa-
                                                     
5  Cf. Benjamin’ s thesis on “capitalism as religion” (Benjamin 1921) and Dirk Baecker (2003). 
6  For a critique of the ignorance of African cultural pluralism, as well as of the ethnocentrism and 
the ideological facets of ethno-philosophy, cf. Hountondji (2001a; 1997).  
7  On the ongoing debate of concepts of ‘multiple modernities’ as theoretical and methodological 
concept to counteract biased evolutionary theories of social change, promoting the Westernization 
of the world with globalizing modernization projects of supposedly universal validity, cf. Arnason 
2005; Eisenstadt 2000; Spohn 2003; Tambiah 2000. The concept of multiple modernities shows that 
there is no single road to the modernization of societies: 
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gating worldwide the neo-liberal credo of the ‘rational actor’8, research should focus more 
on the unexplored potential of indigenous cultures of innovation (cf. Elwert 1996:58-59; Le 
Roy 2003; Hountondji 1997, 2001).  
Even seemingly static cultural factors such as custom, tradition, religion, or ethnicity, which 
are often said to be barriers to economic growth in Africa, have been invented or adapted to 
changing requirements of societies (cf. Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983). In many cases they are not 
backward oriented, but to the contrary, represent multiple modernities of developing areas 
(cf. Arnason 2005; Eisenstadt 2000; Knöbel 2001; Spohn 2003; Tambiah 2000). Therefore, it 
would be misleading to put the blame for lacking development in Africa or elsewhere on the 
cultural heritage in general, the so-called “traditional African culture” or “traditional Afri-
can institutions”, which are frequently considered in a simplistic and deterministic manner 
as customary barrier to democratization or economic growth9. The underlying dualistic con-
cept of culture (modern vs. traditional) ignores the reality of a universe of different co-
existing, and often competing cultures within a society (cf. Sen 2002:2, 9-11; Douglas 2002; 
Odhiambo 2002:2-3)10. A closer look at these so called socio-cultural barriers to growth re-
veals that African cultures are highly differentiated with substantial instances of ‘high mod-
ernity’ (cf. Scott 1998; cf. Sen 2002:10-11 and the debate on ‘multiple modernities’ in Africa, 
cf. Geschiere et al. 2007; Ferguson 2006, 2005; Deutsch et al. 2003; Comaroff/Comaroff 2000).  
                                                     
8  The ‘cognitive-rationalistic reduction of rationality’ may lead to fundamental fallacies, notably, if it 
does not take into account the emotional driving forces of actors (cf. Trotha 1994:6-8). Actors are 
neither determined by social class nor by ratio alone, but strongly influenced by strong emotions, 
like love or hatred, the longing for fame and honor etc. However, these emotions are grown on, 
and embedded in specific cultures (cf. Kohnert 2006).  
9  For some outstanding examples of doubtful oversimplifications of the role of African culture as an 
impediment to modern economic development cf. Harrison/Huntington (2000:xiii) on Ghana, and 
the sharp critique of these culturalistic and essentialist positions by Sen (2002:10-11) and Bier-
schenk/Olivier de Sardan (1998:18-19). The cultural heritage of African societies has often unjustly 
been reduced to dominant characteristics like the rent seeking or prebend economy (cf. Cha-
bal/Daloz 1999; Menzel 2003), “African neopatrimonialism” (cf. Chabal 1998:302; Chabal/Deloz 
1999:128-30) or on “informal constraints” (North 1990:36-37), without due regard to its historical 
roots and dependency on the global economic system, as explained by Bayart (1989) and 
Bilgin/Morton (2002:73-75). For further, more recent examples of doubtful oversimplification, no-
tably in economics, see fashionable theses on ‘ethnic fragmentation’ as allegedly crucial determi-
nant of African rent-seeking societies (cf. Easterly/Levine 1997), on the lack of provision of public 
goods (cf. Kimenyi 2006), or about the size of the informal sector in general (cf. Lassen 2003:1).  
10  For a critique of the lack of regard for the pluralism of African cultures, as well as of ethnocen-
trism and of the ideological facets of ethno-philosophy, cf. Hountondji (2001, 1997). The growing 
awareness of the importance of cultural change for African development is reflected in develop-
ment policy as well: On June 20, 2003, the ministers of culture of the African, Caribbean and Pa-
cific (ACP) countries, on their first meeting in Dakar (Senegal), adopted the Dakar Plan of Action 
to start an innovative approach with culture as a driving force for development (cf. The Courier 
ACP-EU, no. 199, July 2003:8-9 and www.acpse.org). 
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Not everything which is modern, is development oriented at the same time, as was demon-
strated time and again by the critique of monocausal theories of modernization (cf. Deutsch 
et al. 2003; Geschiere et al. 2007; Ferguson 2006). The political economy of occult belief sys-
tems showed for example the different facets of the modernity of African belief in magic and 
witchcraft (cf. Geschiere 1997; Comaroff/Comaroff 2000). Depending on its local environ-
ment and linkages to transnational social spaces these occult belief systems played an eman-
cipatory or delaying role (cf. Kohnert 2003, 2004). In short, rather than blaming the failure of 
development in Africa and elsewhere on cultural barriers, we should investigate their 
propensity to bring to the fore sustainable indigenous cultures of innovation11. 
 
 
2. Specific Cultures of Innovation within the Informal Sector  
Multiple Cultures of Innovation vs. Globalized Western Concept of Modernization 
For African and Afro-American cultures of innovation the breeding ground is the informal, 
not the formal sector. In the following, I prefer to regard the informal sector with Elwert et 
al. (1983:283), Portes et al. (1989:12), and Feige (1990) as those sectors of the economy which 
are not, or only insufficiently recorded, controlled, taxed or otherwise regulated by state 
activities12. Hitherto, academic interest and research focused on innovations in the formal 
sector, e.g. on the state, national political or economic elites, i.e. driving forces of change and 
                                                     
11  As indigenous I consider those cultural innovations, which are rooted in the proper developing 
capacity of the people employing these innovations, e.g. in the sense Paul Richards (1985; 2006), 
Diawara (2003), Masolo (2003), and Brigg/Sharp (2004) used the term. Nevertheless, the reception 
of foreign influence, its acceptance, and its integration into the local imaginary, constitute indige-
nous innovations as well, notably if these external factors are adapted to local conditions, which is 
usually the precondition for wholehearted acceptance. This is especially important to note in view 
of the increasing impact of Glocalization (cf. Schuerkens 2003; Robertson 1995; Kraidy 1999; 
Swyngedouw 2004), and importance of transnational social spaces in the transmittance and adap-
tation of innovations, which will be explained later on in more detail. However, not any local in-
novation applied by the poor peasant is necessarily indigenous and effective; the history of devel-
opment aid is rich in examples of ill-adapted innovations, forced on the peasants by misguided 
development projects (cf. Bierschenk et al. 1993; Kohnert/Weber 1991).  
12  Corresponding to the controversial discussion on the role of the informal sector there exist many, 
sometimes contradicting concepts and definitions (cf. Altvater/Mahnkopf 2002; Chen et al.. 2004; 
Despres 1988; Evers 1987; Elwert et al. 1983; Thomas 1992:3-7; Roitman 1990; Chabal/Daloz 1999; 
Charmes 2000:62). Informality is not an inherent quality of specific economic actions, but a social 
construct (cf. Portes et al. 1989; Ratner 2000:3; Elwert et al. 1983:292), which is visible e.g. concern-
ing the Vermachtung (i.e. restriction of market mechanism by social, political and economic power) 
of markets, or with respect to the linkage between the informal and the formal, the former subsi-
dizing the latter. On the concept of informal politics, developed along similar lines as in economics, 
and on its relevance for African societies, cf. Chabal/Daloz 1999. For a critical review of the latter 
cf. Laakso 1999 and Cowen/Laakso 2002. 
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their innovative agency or management qualities, mostly linked with supposedly universal 
values of democratization and economic growth, with their globally propagated concepts, 
like good governance, accountability, structural adjustment and free markets (cf. Booth et al. 
2006; Grindle 1996; UNESCO 2004; Harrison 2004; Whitfield 2005). Unfortunately, the ne-
glect of informal cultures of innovation prompted the disregard of crucial potentials of in-
novation, particularly in the poorest African countries and in the African Diaspora of the 
Americas.  
Another ‘blind spot’ in research was created by the unfortunate reduction of the manifold 
dimensions of the informal sector to the concept of ‘social capital’ or ‘social networks’ within 
the framework of new Institutional Economics. Whereas Marxism tried to press home its 
point that capital constitutes a social relationship, institutional economics falls into the other 
extreme by trying to reduce the role of 'social capital' to its economic value for (formal) insti-
tution building13. Redirecting research towards the informal sector is indispensable because 
of two major reasons. First, because of the utmost importance of the informal sector for 
LDCs in general and for the African poor in particular14 (cf. Kohnert 2000; Elwert et al. 1983; 
Evers 1987; Ratner 2000:3; Altvater/Mahnkopf 2002; Enquete-Kommission 2002:242). To 
guarantee their survival, the poor, who can no longer rely merely on their local cultural heri-
tage (e.g. traditional norms of reciprocity and solidarity, rapidly disintegrating under the 
pressure of globalization) have to look for innovative solutions within their social setting, 
meaning the informal sector. The quest for these solutions is strongly influenced by cultures 
of innovation. However, and this is the second reason which will be explained in detail be-
low, significant structural differences exist not only between cultures of innovations of the 
formal and the informal sector, but also within the informal sector. Both differences have 
serious repercussions with regard to the developmental trajectory.  
What is more, the fault lines between the formal and the informal become increasingly 
blurred in various ways by globalization. This has been demonstrated with respect to differ-
ent standards for culturally induced innovations between the so-called ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ 
                                                     
13  The ongoing discussion of “social capital” and development (cf. Grootaert/Bastelaer 2002; OECD 
2001:41), includes relevant information on innovative cultural change. However, the concept of “so-
cial capital” is problematic out of various reasons (cf. Sen 2002:5-6). For a radical critique of the con-
ceptual weakness of the ‘social capital’ and ‘social networks’ approach, especially of its (un-) 
historic and essentialist elements cf. Meagher 2005:3, 20; Emirbayer/Goodwin 1994; Blokland/Savage 
2001:225. 
14  In the 1990s, the informal sector contributed on average 41% to the GDP in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Benin: 41%; Ghana: 58%) and 29% in Latin America, according to tentative estimates of the ILO 
(ILO 2002:24; Kohnert 2000). About 72% of total employed outside the agricultural sector were 
employed in the informal sector in SSA (51% in Latin America), cf. Chen et al. 2004: doc 10. 
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development regions by Ferguson (2006:380) and Reno (1998)15, who took ‘governance’ and 
investment criteria concerning strategic investments of oil-multinationals as examples in 
their analyses. The enclaves of the ‘useful’ Africa are not any longer delimitated either by 
national frontiers, or by the divide between the formal and informal, but by boundaries of 
transnational economic and social spaces. The chains of transnational enclaves of ‘useful 
Africa’, e.g. of oil multinationals in West Africa (often backed by powerful hidden national 
interest), function apparently according to rules and ethics beyond the global official dis-
course on governance or on codes of conduct of international development cooperation. The 
poor in these regions are regularly excluded from the 'useful Africa', as shown by the exam-
ples of the Niger Delta and Cabinda. They have to obey special laws of globalization, i.e. 
globalized exclusion and marginalization. One way to overcome these adverse effects of 
globalization for the poor is the quest of the stakeholders for indigenous cultures of innova-
tion (cf. Herbig 1994; Simo 2005; Abele et al. 2001).  
Moreover, globalization is accompanied by new forms of (re-)construction of social and cul-
tural identities and by a new dynamic delimitation of ethnicity. The political economy of 
strategies of exclusion or of political instrumentalization of religion deals with instructive 
examples (cf. politics of ethnicity/xenophobia; Berking 2003; Lentz/Nugent 2000; Kohnert 
2006). In addition, globalization is often geared toward the integration of new elements of a 
universal culture, which are more often than not adapted to the local conditions in order to 
maintain the identity of the group in question (cf. Berking 2003). This kind of ‘glocalization’ 
(cf. Robertson 1995; Altvater 2003; Kraidy 1999; Swyngedouw 2004; Schuerkens 2003)16 is 
typical for the identity formation of innovative groups in the informal sector of Africa and 
the African Diaspora in the Americas. 
 
Differences between Formal and Informal Cultures of Innovation 
In spite of the strong articulation of modes of production of the formal and informal sector17, 
there are decisive differences between the cultures of innovation of both sectors. These differ-
ences concern both the political evaluation of their impact and their social and economic struc-
ture. Generations of innovative Hausa, Fulbe, Igbo and Yoruba entrepreneurs in West Africa, 
                                                     
15  Machiavellist terms apparently coined with allusion to the French Gaullist interpretation of l'Afri-
que utile vs. l'Afrique inutile. 
16  Globalization is not just a question of growing homogenization, uniformity and interdependence, 
but at the same time diversification, the creation of new cross-cultural social spaces of meaning, of 
self-images and social identities and livelihoods; i.e. it is “[t]he universalization of the particular 
and the particularization of the universal” (s. Robertson 1995). 
17  Cf. the thesis of the informal sector subsiding the formal Elwert et al. 1983; Evers 1987; Ratner 
2000:3 
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for example, contributed effectively to the economic integration of the region through parallel 
cross-border trade between Nigeria and its neighbors. They thus established a sustainable 
culture of transnational trade networks (cf. Ufford 2004; Igué/Soule 1992; Meillassoux 1971). 
Although they pursued similar goals as the regional organization ECOWAS, they were ac-
cused by the latter of undermining national economies through their illegal activities. Conse-
quently, they were harassed by the state (cf. Meagher 2003, 1997, 1995). With regard to struc-
tural differences it is to note that informal cultures of innovation are based mainly on local oral 
traditions and empirical indigenous knowledge18, whereas their formal counterparts rely 
heavily on written sources, science and school knowledge on a global level. As a rule, the for-
mer are adapted to their respective natural, economic, social and political environment with a 
relatively strong propensity for flexible response to external shocks. Even though their rele-
vance is mostly restricted to the micro or meso level, they bear significant potential for innova-
tions in the poorer sections of the population even on a national level and beyond (cf. Barber 
2004; Brown/Ulijn 2004; Flyn/Chatman 2001; Diawara 2003).  
Indigenous cultures of innovation19 are especially relevant for LDCs, but also for the mar-
ginalized African populations of emerging industrialized countries like Brazil (cf. chap. III), 
notably because of their exceptionally limited access to resources. It is open to debate, 
whether and to what extend there are still niches for the development of indigenous cultures 
of innovation of the poor under conditions of glocalization (cf. Briggs/Sharp 2004; Masolo 
2003; Diawara 2003; Richards 2006; 1985). The outcome largely depends on the articulation 
with different dominating cultures of innovation and with transnational social spaces.  
 
                                                     
18  For the definition, concept and an annotated bibliography on ‘indigenous knowledge’ and its link 
to local cultures of innovation, cf. website: www.ik-pages.net/about-ik.html, April 25, 2006; which 
replaced the Nuffic’s Indigenous Knowledge Unit that was responsible for maintaining this web 
site from 1992 until 2004. 
19  'Indigenous' are considered those cultural innovations which are rooted in the proper develop-
ment capacity of the stakeholders who apply these innovations (cf. Richards 1985, 2006; Diawara 
2003; Masolo 2003; Briggs/Sharp 2004). However, the fault line between indigenous and exoge-
nous innovations becomes blurred by the effects of glocalization, notably if one takes into account 
their historic roots. The incorporation of foreign cultural elements, and their integration into ones 
own life-world with due respect to local conditions, constitutes an indigenous innovation in our 
definition as well. However, once again we have to stress the ambiguous nature of such innova-
tions, which are not necessarily effective. The history of development aid is full of examples of 
failed, allegedly well adapted innovations, as the example of the transfer of the development cul-
ture of the ‘Green Revolution’ or of the ‘Training and Visit’ approach to agricultural extension 
from Asia to Africa showed (cf. Bierschenk et al. 1993; Kohnert/Weber 1991). 
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Towards a Comprehensive Approach in the Analysis of Cultures of Innovation  
Recognizing informal sector cultures of innovation as distinct from formal sector ones, as 
explained above does not suffice. It is open to question, whether an approach based on the 
assumption of unsystematically structured or even unstructured ‘informal cultures’20 is 
methodologically sound. Besides the inter-sectoral divergences of formal and informal cul-
tures of innovations there are also strong indicators of intra-sectoral differences. This is not 
to deny the existence of common intersections of informal cultures of innovation. However, 
more recent studies demonstrate that it is crucial, to take into account not just the impact of 
the heterogeneity of the informal sector in general21, but also of a structured variety of in-
formal cultures of innovation. The latter may be differentiated according to space (geo-
graphic as well as social space) and cultural setting (e.g. class, gender, ethnicity, religion etc.; 
cf. Abele et al. 2001; Fuchs/Schönberger 2005; Levine 1965; Simo 2005; Thomas 2000).  
In the following I propose a more comprehensive approach to the analysis of cultures of 
innovation which takes into account not just inter-sectoral, but also possible intra-sectoral 
cleavages and potentials. More precisely, I shall focus on the impact of differentiation ac-
cording to class and gender, and its representation and articulation in different regional and 
transnational contexts.  
The articulation of multiple cultures of innovation, its linkages, mutual reinforcement or 
obstruction, is especially interesting with regard to the comparison of cultures in Africa and 
of the African Diaspora, notably that in the Caribbean and Latin America. What matters in 
this respect is not just the common socio-cultural heritage, but also its actual embeddedness 
in common transnational social spaces, as indicated by the ongoing discussion of concepts of 
the African Diaspora22. This vision, namely, to rewrite global modern history ‘from below’, 
taking African migration over the centuries as an integral, yet, still unfinished process (in the 
Habermasian sense of an ‘unfinished project’), could contribute to overcoming the prevail-
ing eurocentric interpretation of ‘modernity’e and of the linkage between culture and devel-
opment (s. Patterson/Kelley 2000; Okpewho et al. 2001; Manning 2003; Zeleza 2005). In view 
                                                     
20  For examples cf. World Bank (2001:171), or David McClelland (cf. McClelland/Winter 1969), who 
departs from a worldwide linkage between achievement motivation and economic growth. 
21  E.g. its stratification according to different socio-economic strata, as recognized by the World Bank 
(2006:187) and ILO (2002).  
22  Cf. concepts of Black Atlantic / unfinished migrations; s. Goyal 2003; Cobley 1999; Ajaji 2000; Cal-
laghy et al. 2001; Chivallon/Fields 2002; Mann/Bay 2001; Okpewho et al. 2001; Manning 2003; Ze-
leza 2005. – The term ‘diaspora’ indicates at the same time a condition, a process and a discourse. 
Zeleza (2005:41-42), whereby ‘Africa’ represents not only a geographic unit with its own history, 
but at the same time an imaginary space (p. 44): Crucial element of the African Diaspora is the 
shaping of its culture by the experience of repression and exploitation, and the resistance against it 
(cf. Byfield 2000:4-5; Butler 2000). This structural formation is a central denominator of both the 
marginalized and poor people of Africa and the African Diaspora. 
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of a much deplored weakness of current Diaspora Studies, its essentialist character and its 
lack of systematic cross-reference between actual lifeworlds of the homeland and diaspora, 
it is imperative to establish robust empirically proven links between both, in order to con-
tribute to the advancement of African Diaspora studies (cf. Manning 2003:506)23. Hitherto, 
empirical studies on the current articulation of African communities in Africa and beyond, 
concentrated on economic aspects (e.g. remittances, capital flow). Cultural linkages were 
disregarded or referred to with anecdotic evidence only, although they could have at least as 
profound an impact as economic factors. Aimé Ceseaire's Négritude, or the US-American 
Black Power & Black Consciousness movement on African liberation movements and on the 
self-reflection of Africans in general (cf. Gilroy 1993; Mkandawire 2002), as mirrored in the 
current discourse on African Renaissance by politicians of the post-apartheid government in 
Pretoria or elsewhere bear testimony to it.  
 
Multiple Fault Lines: On the Threefold Differentiation of Cultures of Innovation 
The boundaries of cultures of innovation do not necessarily run along the formal and infor-
mal divide. Their articulation is characterized by a differentiation on three major structural 
levels: 
- between the formal and the informal sector (inter-sectoral differentiation) 
- between different social strata of the informal sector (intra-sectoral differentiation) 
- between local and global or transnational social spaces (transnational differentiation). 
Depending on the specific impact of these multiple fault lines, cultures of innovations can 
supplement and reinforce (synergy effect), or obstruct and even oppose each other, leading 
in extreme cases to violent confrontations, resembling local ‘cultural revolutions’ or a ‘clash 
of cultures’ (including drastic changes in gender roles). As a rule, at least one of the oppos-
ing groups, mostly the challenger, represents himself as ‘revolutionary’ in the sense of an 
innovative-emancipative force. A corresponding socio-political legitimation, its forging and 
consolidation as culture of innovation, can significantly contribute to enhancing the chances 
of goal-implementation. The members of these groups constitute through their actions, ori-
ented by specific innovative cultures, those multiple modernities which are characteristic for 
the development process of LDCs. Examples in this respect are the 'cults of counter-violence' 
                                                     
23  These links are not restricted to the ancient roots in the transatlantic slave trade, when about six 
million Africans were forcibly taken to Brazil between 1550 and 1850. On the contrary, they are 
very much alive, as indicated by the ongoing (more or less enforced) migration of Africans to 
Europe and even to Latin American countries like Brazil.  
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(Wilson 1992), which originated in the course of the liberation movements in various African 
countries in the informal sector24.  
Within the informal sector, differentiation may run along class, ethnic, religious or gender 
lines. Actors of the different groups have special access to resources, divergent potentials, 
interests and chances for action. Correspondingly, productivity, personal income and politi-
cal interest is as a rule class and gender specific. The same holds for the sub-cultures of the 
informal sector, created and maintained by activists of these groups. An example for the 
latter is the njang-njang movement of Guinea-Bissau in the 1980s, were women defended 
their newly secured rights, gained by their active part in the war of liberation, through a 
cultural renewal (cf. Kurz 1996; Jong 1987). Opposing the role-back strategy of old and new 
imposing regulos, they created and sustained a gender-oriented religious liberation move-
ment. First limited to their own ethnic group the Balante, it later was extended nation wide, 
comprising witchcraft accusations against dominant rulers (s. Kohnert 1988, 1996:1350). Be-
cause these intra-sectoral fault-lines often have a decisive impact on the implementation of 
the aims of cultures of innovation, they deserve special attention. This will be demonstrated 
in depth by taking the example of inter-class differentiation at the grass-roots level between 
the poor, the middle and the upper or ruling class25. 
There is a threefold socio-economic differentiation of the informal sector (cf. Kohnert 2000) 
which extends to corresponding cultures of innovation26. 
a) The poor: Cultures of innovation of the poor have as primordial orientation the assur-
ance of their survival as human beings. But in addition they are often directed to-
wards emancipation from oppression and empowerment; therefore, these cultures 
frequently represent a socially emancipatory force (cf. Altvater 2003:14-18). The poor 
are marginalized because of their weak resource position, including limited individ-
ual development potential (lack of education, poor health etc.). Their survival as hu-
                                                     
24  Corresponding 'popular modes of political action', trying to reinterpret traditional communal ideals 
in an innovative manner, and to implement it country-wide, similar to the famous ideals of the 
French bourgeois revolution, are typical for the transition process of many African states (s. Gesch-
iere 1988, 1997). – Similar sub-cultures of violence and counter-violence are known from the Euro-
pean history as well, as the example of robber barons and peasant wars in feudal Europe showed 
(cf. Elias 1969.2:405f.; Dinges 1998). 
25  Classification conceived as ‘ideal-types’ in the Weberian sense. As there exist exceptions and 
blurred borders, the following classification is designed for qualitative rather than quantitative 
comparison, as it may not allow in all cases for robust empirical falsification (cf. Prandy 2002). - 
Future empirical research on this matter should be complemented and cross-checked with a social 
distance approach to stratification (cf. Bottero/Prandy 2003). Answering recent calls from several 
sources for a renewal of class analysis that encompasses economic, social and cultural elements, 
this approach conceptualizes classes as social spaces, identified by mapping the network of social 
interactions that result in classes formed by relations of social closeness or distance. 
26  Concerning methodical delimitation cf. fn 27 above. 
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man beings depends entirely on the informal sector, as their access to the formal sec-
tor is as a rule severely restricted in several respects (schooling, labor- and capital 
market, housing, health-sector, judiciary etc.). The effects of globalized neo-liberal 
structural adjustment programs have rather spurred the marginalization of the poor 
in the past decade. Typical actors are migrant workers, families of small farmers and 
petty traders, child-laborers and -soldiers. Their culture of innovation is restricted to 
indigenous innovations. They are especially vulnerable to external shocks (e.g. disas-
ters, epidemics, economic or political crisis) and liable to harmful external interven-
tions (e.g. warlordism, drug- and child-trafficking). Women, children and the elderly 
are disproportionately represented in this stratum.  
b) The middle class: In general, their resource position allows for their reproduction. They 
are deeply engrained in both sectors. However, this class can be divided in two sub-
divisions. The low middle class encompasses those whose resource position is endan-
gered and who are threatened by social decline. They take part in the activities of the 
informal sector mainly to secure a supplementary income. Their innovation culture is 
determined by the aim to preserve their acquired economic and social status. Typical 
actors are wage earners and employees in the formal sector, middle peasants, and 
small traders. On the contrary, the upper middle class (senior officers, academics, 
small and middle entrepreneurs etc.) is oriented toward risk prevention and income 
diversification. Their involvement in the informal sector is meant to consolidate their 
position in the formal sector, e.g. an elevated career in the civil service. Their innova-
tive culture is directed towards social advancement and social brokerage.  
c) Upper class: The rich and powerful; their livelihood is secured in the formal sector, 
amongst others by their opulent resource position, and is sustained by social and po-
litical networks in which they are embedded. They use the informal sector strategi-
cally for profit maximizing and risk diversification, e.g. by large-scale parallel trans-
border trade (smuggling in used cars, drugs, weapons or humans, re-export etc.), 
warlordism. This is predominantly a male domain and the corresponding innovative 
culture aims at power consolidation. Local rulers frequently use their innovative cul-
tures for the pursuit of vested interests and the suppression of the poor and margin-
alized, which then leads to the cultural foundations of ‘markets of violence’, an-
chored at the cross-road of the formal and informal, local, regional and transnational 
social spaces (cf. Elwert 1996; Collier/Hoeffler 2001; Avant 2005). 
Across these socio-economic fault lines is a gender differentiation of the informal sector and 
its innovative cultures, which typically aims at assuring the reproduction of the family (cf. 
Chen et al. 2004: doc 9-12) or the emancipation from male dominance (cf. the example of 
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njang-njang in Guinea-Bissau, quoted above). Hence, ‘engendering development’ is not just a 
normative end in itself, but can be deemed to have positive repercussions on economic and 
political development, too (cf. Stern 2002:13)27. 
African cultures of innovation in Benin, Haiti and Brazil are especially suited for an in-depth 
study of these articulations, not just because of their common socio-cultural heritage, but 
because the continuing cultural exchange, which is not restricted to bilateral contacts but 
concerns the exchange of cultures of innovation between Africa and the global African Di-
aspora as well. 
In times of globalization, the figuration of embeddedness of conflicting groups and cultures 
is influenced to a growing degree by transnational social spaces This holds true especially 
for the articulation of African cultures and societies with those of the African Diaspora. 
Again, the impact of these pluri-local and transnational social spaces is ambiguous, it can be 
conflict reducing or enhancing28. 
 
 
3. Case Studies: Vodun-Based Cultures of Innovation and Empowerment in Benin, Brazil 
and Haiti in Times of Globalization  
The impact of cultural change on development is strong, but highly ambiguous. For exam-
ple, similar sentiments or value-orientations may work in opposite directions, depending on 
the social setting and the nature of the group involved. Seemingly identical process-
innovations, like popular movements for a democratic renewal and for sovereign National 
Conferences in Benin and Togo, for instance in the early 1990s, resulted in opposite out-
comes. The sustainability of cultural innovations is even more difficult to ascertain. What 
                                                     
27  Examples are given by Chamlee (1993), who shows that women in the Ghanaian informal sector 
created an innovative culture of trust-based business relations; Bawah et al. 1999 showed how 
women in North Ghana, assisted by the Navrongo family planning program, implemented eman-
cipative methods of birth control against the resistance of formal decision makers who preferred to 
keep the traditional regulations of the bride price. Burger, Collier, and Gunning (1996) demon-
strated that household-heads in Kenya adapted innovations predominantly from innovators of the 
same sex (quoted in World Bank 2001:207).  
28  This has been analyzed by the author in more detail by the example of anti-witchcraft movements 
in South Africa and in Ghana (cf. Kohnert 2003, 2004). Further cults of counter-violence are to be 
found in the history of the African Diaspora in Latin America, e.g. the liberation movement of the 
Haitian slaves during colonial rule and the slave revolts of the quilombos in Brazil in the 19th cen-
tury. In this respect the more recent confrontation between the movement of landless laborers 
(peyzan malere) and their rulers in Haiti may be worth mentioning too (cf. Ewen 2003), as well as 
the violent classes between the movimento Negro and their Brazilian rulers (cf. Hanchard 1998, 
1999). However, apart from the successful Haitian slave uprising, most of these 'cultural revolu-
tions' were not sustainable. 
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appeared as development oriented improvement in the short run might reveal itself as ob-
struction in the long run, and vice versa. Nevertheless, cultural change is neither casual nor 
arbitrary. History shows that it can and should be directed.  
A significant number of cultural innovations were inspired by religion. A well-known ex-
ample is the popular movement for democratization and human rights, driven by the libera-
tion theology in the Americas since the 1970s (cf. Smith 1991; Hayes 1996). In the following I 
shall elaborate on comparative studies of the less known example of popular movements for 
democratization in Benin, Haiti, and Brazil. They share as common denominator the strong 
influence of cultures of innovation inspired by an enlightened vodun (including its Afro-
American equivalent), and different related denominations of Christian orientation on de-
mocratic transition and empowerment of the poor. Further comparative studies on the ar-
ticulation of agents of cultural change linked to African religion and ‘traditional medicine’ 
HIV-prevention and indigenous knowledge in African societies are envisaged. 
The following comparative case studies, intended for further hypothesis generation within 
the framework of the above contribution to theory-building show, however, that any mono-
causal explanation of cultural change, which focuses solely on religion or another single 
variable, is doomed to fail. The outcome of cultures of innovation is a process which de-
pends to a large extend on the articulation with competing cultures. Only a differentiated 
analysis, taking due care of the articulation of different strands of cultural innovations and 
their linkage to social stratification, transnational social spaces and globalization as outlined 
above, makes for their explicatory and prognostic power. 
 
Benin: Multiple Local Cultures of Innovation, Exemplary for the Whole of Francophone 
Africa  
Benin, formerly known as Dahomey, is located at the West African bight of Benin, sand-
wiched between the neighboring giant Nigeria and the former German colony Togo. It has a 
reputation as both, the quartier Latin of francophone Africa and the cradle of vodun. The Be-
nin democratic renewal (renouveau démocratique) which started in 1989, thereby putting an 
end to nearly two decades of autocratic socialist rule, was welcomed as a model for democ-
ratization in sub-Saharan Africa. Not least in light of its spread effects, Benin provides an 
illustrative example of the impact of innovative cultures on democratization, rooted in, and 
inseparably linked to transnational social spaces, as explained below: 
i. Conflicting cultures of opposition movements imposed the democratic renewal. Contrary to 
a widespread belief, the second wind of change in Benin was less determined by the 
globalized effects of the fall of the Berlin Wall, but was prepared and triggered off by 
popular indigenous opposition movements. As shown below, they were inspired by 
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development oriented ethics of Christian organizations, and they closely interacted 
with agents of change encouraged by an modern universalistic vodun29. While creat-
ing different, often conflicting cultures of innovation in the 1980s, they nevertheless 
upheld a common aim, paving the way for the fall of the Kérékou-regime (cf. 
Banégas 1995, 1995a).  
ii. These movement can be broadly classified as belonging in two categories: popular 
movements of resistance ‘from below’, and elitist opposition movements. The former 
comprised organizations from different denominations, notably trade unions and 
peasant groups which opposed the payment of per captia tax, obstructed or circum-
vented public regional integrated development programs (CARDERs), and pro-
moted a general climate of passive resistance and civic disobedience. The outlawed 
communist party (Parti communiste du Dahomey, PCD, founded in 1977), which es-
tablished its headquarters in two rural districts (Djakotomé, in Mono province, and 
Boukoumbé in Atakora), strove to unite these socio-cultural forces in a common op-
position front since 1988 and played an outstanding role in the organization of mass 
protest in December 1989 (cf. Banégas 1995:29).  
iii. The opposition groups of the elite, spearheaded by the student and teachers unions, 
were embedded in the informal network of the quartier Latin of francophone Africa30. 
They had a decisive impact on the democratization process in general, and on the 
organization of the sovereign National Conference (1990) in Cotonou in particular31. 
The latter initiated a peaceful alternation of political power structures in Benin at the 
national level. This renouveau démocratique, mainly organized by an educated elite, 
embracing different ethnic, regional, professional and religious groups of the civil 
society, was admired as a shining example by other African countries. Although 
even marginalized groups, like peasant-, and local development associations re-
ceived a chance to participate in it (cf. Banégas 1995a; Ehuzu 1990; ONEPI 1990), the 
                                                     
29  As, for example, represented by the syncretistic movement for the inculturation of Christianity 
and the reinterpretation of the vodun (Mewihwendo, or Sillon Noir, cf. Adoukonou 1989); or by the 
Atingali and Glo- and Kpe-vodun, imported from Ghana, cf. Tall 1995, 1995a, 2003; Mayrargue 2002; 
Aguessy 1993. 
30  The expression “quartier Latin” refers to the high percentage of an educated francophone elite in 
Benin, compared with other French speaking African countries (cf. Bako Arifari 1995). However, 
we should bear in mind that the Benin elite, since the advent of colonial rule, maintained close so-
cial and political links not only to Paris, but to their peers in Dakar, Abidjan and Lomé, as well. 
Therefore, the network of the quartier Latin is inseparable from the transnational social spaces of 
French speaking West Africa. 
31  In this context the “National Conference” refers to the tradition of the “états généraux” of the 
French revolution (cf. Eboussi-Boulaga 1993; Adamon 1995; Heilbrunn 1995; Houngbedji 1994; 
Monga 1995; Monkotan 1991; Nwajiaku 1994; Séhouéto 1994).  
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grass-roots opposition movements, the ‘primitive rebels’ in Eric Hobsbawm’s terms, 
who had paved the way to this first successful civil coup d'état in Africa, were later 
disregarded and deprived of the fruits of their resistance. 
iv. Ambiguous role of African religion and of traditional leaders: The democratization process 
in Benin had been initiated and promoted to a great extend by the ‘return of the reli-
gious’ (Mayrargue 2002), i.e. by rival popular movements, inspired by modern anti-
witchcraft cults, incorporated into universalistic vodun as well as the Pentecostals, 
and the catholic church, all united in its opposition to the ‘socialist project’ of the 
Kérékou-area which had become incredible (cf. Tall 1995, 1995a). Whereas the Marx-
ist policy of the Kérékou-regime in the 1970s and early 1980s regarded African relig-
ions and their representatives as a ‘relict of feudalism’, being highly suspect of the 
role of the Catholic church as well; the latter played an important role as mediator 
and broker of the renouveau démocratique. This resulted in a change of roles in its lead-
ing ranks, notably of Mgr. De Souza, archbishop of Cotonou, who became president 
of the National Conference and of the interim government. But the failure of the ‘so-
cialist project’ resulted also in a new legitimization of an enlightened vodun, of char-
ismatic Christian churches (like the Chrétiens célestes), and new anti-witchcraft cults 
(cf. Tall 2003:77, 87). Occult belief systems, notably the vodun and the belief in magic 
and witchcraft, played an ambiguous role in Benin’s development process (cf. 
Kohnert 1996:1351; Tall 1995)32. Depending on local historical pre-conditions and the 
actual social setting in different provinces, not all “traditional authorities” (like vil-
lage heads and vodun priests) were necessarily ‘progressive’. Some of them acted as 
intermediaries and facilitators of indigenous innovative capacity that promoted de-
velopment, others operated as stumbling blocks of cultural change (Elwert-
Kretschmer 1995; Tall 2003). 
v. Indigenous civic sub-cultures in West Africa as pioneers of transition: In addition, interac-
tive civic (sub-)cultures in different West African countries contributed to indige-
nous cultural innovations “from below”, which manifested themselves for example 
in local political theatre groups of students, griots and NGOs, which prepared the 
political terrain for the process of democratic renewal in Benin, Togo and Côte 
d’Ivoire (cf. Séhouéto 1994; Monga 1995). At the same time, dynamic Fulbe intellec-
tuals acted at the meso and micro level as political and cultural brokers of indige-
                                                     
32  On the eve of the electoral campaign for the presidential elections in 1991, the contender of M. 
Kérékou, and subsequent winner of the elections, Nicéphore Soglo, was empoisoned and nearly 
died. The crime was attributed to political adversaries of Soglo, who were accused of employing 
witchcraft with the help of vodun witch doctors (cf. interview with N. Soglo in L’Intelligent, No. 
2094, February 27, 2001:33).  
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nous cultural change in Northern Benin. They promoted a new, more development 
oriented ethnic identity, based on the mediation of the aims of the modern nation 
state and traditional elements of Fulbe culture (cf. Bierschenk 1995). 
vi. Bottom-up process of indigenous cultural change and a transition dominated by aid, local de-
velopment brokers and venality. As a result, initially the transition process in Benin had 
been promoted not so much by a transfer of Western culture, knowledge, technology 
or finance but by a bottom-up process of indigenous cultural change. Later on, it be-
came dominated by a top-down propagation of concepts of Western political culture, 
focusing on institutional change and 'good governance', as promoted by the condi-
tioning of official development assistance. Local brokers of development aid acceler-
ated this change in cultural policy, which was however ill-adapted to sustainable 
development programs(cf. Bierschenk et al. 1993). 
vii. A globalized culture of Human Rights standards strengthened the Constitutional Court in 
Cotonou as an effective third tiers of government. Driven by a strong impetus of libera-
tion from the autocratic rule of the past (i.e. the “Beninism-Marxism” of Kérékou’s 
socialist regime, 1972-89), and by globalized standards of Human Rights (backed by 
the international donor community), the Constitutional Court under the guidance of 
the first president Elisabeth Poignon, established a new culture of independent judi-
ciary as an effective counterbalance of power at the national level (cf. Rotman 2004). 
Unfortunately, this promising development did not trickle down as expected to the 
lower levels of the Benin judicial system. The latter remained highly corrupt and ex-
posed to the politics of the ‘African command state’ (cf. Elwert 2001; Kohnert 1997). 
Subsequently, the ‘politics of the belly’ once more gained predominance, even in the 
decisions of the Benin High Courts, during the role-back strategy under the second 
and third Kérékou regime (1996-2003). 
viii. Promising development of a free press as fourth tier of control of the state in the early 1990s, 
weakened by globalized standards of media markets, poor training and venality. In the early 
stages of transition, the free press in Benin33, driven by highly motivated local agents 
of cultural change, acted more as an effective control of government and state ad-
ministration than the public legislative institutions. However, the commercialization 
and decline of professional ethics of journalists, caused among others by the daily 
strife for survival in a highly competitive but limited market, affected the role of the 
media as fourth tiers of state control (cf. Adjovi 2002). Nowadays many tabloids tend 
                                                     
33  Benin still has the highest rank on the index of press freedom, of all African states; it was on about 
the same level as United Kingdom in 2005, according to the Press Freedom Index, published regu-
larly by Reporters sans frontiers. 
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to be riddled with venality and tainted by globalized Western standards of the rain-
bow press (cf. Frère 1995). 
ix. Mushrooming local private radio stations as transmission belt of cultural change. Well-
adapted local media, notably mushrooming local private radio stations, based on a 
close intermarriage of international technology transfer and local culture, are helpful 
in promoting political innovations at the grass-root level (cf. Grätz 1997; Frère 1995). 
This stands in stark contrast to the chronically ill adapted top-down public rural ra-
dio extension programs of the former socialist Kérékou-regime. 
x. A long established culture of a transit economy (Entrepôt Trade), driven by globalization and 
innovative entrepreneurs, promoted economic growth more effectively than aid. Democrati-
zation without economic growth is hardly sustainable. In this respect Benin profited 
from a long established culture of parallel trans-border markets (transit economy, cf. 
l'Etat-entrepôt, Igué/Soulé 1992), dating back to pre-colonial socio-cultural pre-
colonial West African trading networks of Hausa and Yoruba traders. An innovative 
shadow economy, pushed by lucrative transnational parallel markets (transit econ-
omy towards landlocked neighboring Sahel countries and Nigeria), which flourished 
in the aftermath of the Nigerian oil-boom and the ‘second wind of change’, probably 
contributed more to Benin’s economic growth than the massive influx of develop-
ment aid (cf. Beuving 2004; Igué/Soule 1992). In this respect, the 'politics of the belly', 
combined with the fragile state monopoly of violence and taxation of the new liberal-
democratic state, which have often been considered a barrier to economic growth, 
may have created, quite to the contrary, a growth-inducing momentum. 
xi. The newly established laissée-faire culture, cultivated as antithesis to the centralized economy 
of the socialist state, had ambiguous effects. The ongoing top-down program of liberali-
zation and privatization of parastatals, enforced, last but not least, by aid condition-
ality of international donors, had ambiguous effects. While it was meant to guaran-
tee effective management, in some central cases, it rather tended to create a symbio-
sis and concentration of economic and political power during the implementation 
process. Powerful entrepreneurs, enriched through political patronage, transformed 
themselves into new political leaders (cf. the case of multi-millionaire Séfou Fagbo-
houn and his influential political party Mouvement Africain pour la Démocratie et le 
Progrès, MADEP)34. 
xii. A development inducing written local culture might be more effectively stimulated through 
promotion of informal literature markets than by top-down aid. The development of a 
                                                     
34  The general secretary of MADEP, Mrs. Antoine Idji Kolawolé, former minister of foreign affairs, 
was elected as president of the Benin National Assembly on April 24, 2003. 
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written culture (Schriftkultur, in the holistic German sense, which is not restricted to 
alphabetization), is an important means in promoting indigenous innovations. How-
ever, it is still in its initial stage in Benin, in spite of decades of development aid to 
this end. Encouraging local market mechanisms to promote a written culture on the 
regional and national levels (like the Onitsha market literature in neighboring Nige-
ria) might be more promising than top-down development aid (cf. Elwert 1997). 
xiii. Top-down approaches of decentralization promoted ‘politics of the belly’ rather than actual 
empowerment. Decentralization policy, as promoted by massive development aid 
since the early 1990s, was readopted and transformed by local political actors accord-
ing to their own special logic and interests. This did not necessarily lead to an in-
crease in local participation, democracy, or rule of law (in the Western sense) at the 
local level (cf. Alber 1997; Alber/Sommer 1999; Bierschenk 2003, 1999; Grätz 1996). 
 
Haiti: Democratic Transition Driven by Subversive Cultures of Innovation, Inspired by 
Vodun 
The specific blend of religious cultures of innovation (vodun and Catholicism, cf. I (i)&(ii) 
above) that stimulated democratic transition in Benin, had an impact in Haiti as well, al-
though in a different manner. Nevertheless, the stakeholders as well as outside observers, 
went to great length to stress the common African roots of their venture with lasting reper-
cussions. Haiti is the only country worldwide, where African slaves, guided by vodun as 
liberation theology, defeated their colonial masters, establishing their own free state already 
in the 19th century. Since the 1980s, democratic transition was again driven by subversive 
cultures of innovation, inspired by vodun and Christian liberation theology. 
i. The Haitian vodun acted as modern driving force of democratic transition, along 
with transnational networks of liberation theology, against the firm resistance of the 
religious and political establishment: Since the slave rebellion of 1791-94 and the 
subsequent liberation of Haiti, the Haitian variety of vodun (vaudoun or vodou, in 
French spelling, dominated by Dahomean and Yoruba elements, imported by the 
slave trade) was the religion of the people, and crucial in forming the Haitian ethos 
and nationality. About 90% of the population adhere to it. However, the overwhelm-
ing part of the elite, politicians and development experts alike, publicly denounced it 
as superstition, relict of the past and impediment to development35. In addition, Ca-
tholizism, recognized by the concordat of 1860 as only officially religion in Haiti, has 
                                                     
35  Cf. Rotberg 1976:356: “It is often said that vodun kept Haiti backward. Probably the reverse is true: 
vodun flourished because the rulers of Haiti denied their multitudinous citizenry a chance to 
transform a socially and economically stagnant rural life.” 
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tried in vain to eliminate vodun36, even though it maintained a fragile peace with its 
rival on the operational level by incorporating elements of its liturgy in its own ser-
vice since the 1950s (cf. Corbett 1988). Thus, the church in fact only copied a tactic, 
successfully employed by adherents of vodun already some three hundred years be-
fore. Then, African slaves had camouflaged their continuing worship of vodun, out-
lawed by the church and the colonial authorities, by integrating Christian elements in 
its own pantheon. Vodun was officially recognized as state religion besides Catholi-
cism only by the second Aristide government (2000-2004) in a desperate act of popu-
list legislation in April 200337. Nevertheless, in informal politics, vodun had always 
had a great impact, both on the local and the national level. Various political leaders 
instrumentalized the cult with ambiguous effects, ranging from the emancipation 
from slavery (the only slave rebellion worldwide that succeeded in creating a proper 
nation state), to the brutal oppression by the tonton macouts, who were assisted by 
corrupted vodun priests under the Duvalier dynasty, which ended in political tur-
moil in 1986 (cf. Rotberg 1997:28-29; Laguerre 1990; Whitten/Torres 1998:526-528; Mi-
chel/Bellegarde-Smith 2006). Thus, during political transition, antagonistic cultures of 
innovation in Haitian’s informal sector, each reinterpreting vodun in their own 
group’s interest, portraying themselves as agent of change and ‘modernizer’, were 
interlocked in a deadly confrontation (cf. Averill 1997). 
ii. To counteract dictatorship and gross human rights violation by the Duvalier regime 
and its successors, a grass-root movement for the empowerment of the poor and 
marginalized, called Ti Legliz (Creole, literally meaning ‘small church’), came into 
being in the 1970s. Religion, both vodun and the Haitian variety of Christian theol-
                                                     
36  The hierarchy of the Catholic church upheld its critical attitude vis à vis the Ti Legliz movement up 
to the present days, as shown by the following examples. On September 11, 1988, Aristide's 
church, Saint-Jean Bosco, was attacked during service by tonton makouts, in an unsuccessful at-
tempt on Aristide's life, wounding 70, killing thirteen worshipers, and destroying the building. 
Haitians began to compare their hero to the early biblical prophets and to Makandal, the legen-
dary vodun warrior-priest. The church hierarchy, however, just called for reconciliation and con-
demned the popular church for its political involvement. Two month later, Aristide was dismissed 
from the Rome-based Salesian order (cf. Taylor 1991:817-19). The highest representative of the 
church in Haiti, archbishop of Port-au-Prince, Mgr. Ligondé, was accused of siding with the plot-
ters in the abortive coup against Aristide in January 1990, and fled the country. Immediately after 
the military coup of September 30, 1991, which ousted the Aristide government, the Vatican was 
the only country to recognize the regime of General Cédras, the coup leader immediately (cf. Jala-
bert 2004:3, 5). 
37  By this decree the state recognized baptisms, marriages, and funerals performed by vodun offi-
cials; this constituted a significant step in guaranteeing religious freedom and in breaking down 
Haitians social class structure. 
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ogy of liberation played a decisive role in this movement38. They progressively trans-
formed these ecclesial base organizations into ‘grass-root communities’ with a three-
fold vocation, religious, social and political. The movement gained full momentum 
with the religious-political campaigns of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Catho-
lic priest of an impoverished parish in Port-au-Prince, in the aftermath of the deposi-
tion of ‘Baby Doc’ (Duvalier jun.). Subsequently, the movement expanded fast, 
through the formation of thousands of Ti Legliz and similar Tet Ansamn peasant 
groups, notably in the countryside and among the youth and slum dwellers in the 
cities. They were considered as cradle of the ‘l’Organisation populaire Famni 
Lavalas’, forerunner of the renowned party ‘Lavalas’ or ‘Famni Lavalas’ (Creole, 
‘family avalanche’ in English, referring to the biblical flood); a title borrowed from a 
popular peasant song (cf. Kuelker 1998; Corbett et al. 1999; Jalabert 2004; Taylor 1992; 
Rotberg 1976) designed to bring Aristide to power. As a consequence the movement 
was deemed a serious menace by the power elite that acted accordingly. Politically 
motivated persecution, intimidation, torture, imprisonment and murder were at the 
order of the day. Even the US-government and the CIA, which sided with the Hai-
tian political establishment, realized the revolutionary potential of vodun as being 
greater than that of the Haitian Communist Party at that time (cf. Patrick Bellegarde-
Smith, in: Corbett et al. 1999), an assessment which proved to be quite accurate. Not-
withstanding, the death of thousands of activist, and at least nine unsuccessful 
murder attempts of the movement’s leader, four years later in December 1990, J. B. 
Aristide became the first freely and democratically elected president in the country’s 
history. The population celebrated the event as a ‘second independence’, with refer-
ence to the liberation from slavery some 200 years ago. Yet the traditional power 
                                                     
38  One indicator for the ‘marriage’ between Haitian liberation theology (teyoloji liberasyon) and 
vodun was the close linkage with Boukman's Prayer (cf. below) as base of the Ti Legliz phi-
losophy. The prayer, inspired by the wisdom of vodun, had been already once before the call 
to action by Boukman Dutty, a houngan or vodou priest, that launched the Haitian Revolution, 
on August 14, 1791, at the Bwa Kayiman Vodun ceremony. Some two hundred years later it 
contributed again to the formation of specific Haitian liberation theology. – The following is 
an English translation of Boukman’s Righteous Prayer: “The god who created the earth; who 
created the sun that gives us light. The god who holds up the ocean; who makes the thunder 
roar. Our God who has ears to hear. You who are hidden in the clouds; who watch us from 
where you are. You see all that the white has made us suffer. The white man’s god asks him to 
commit crimes. But the god within us wants to do good. Our god, who is so good, so just, He 
orders us to revenge our wrongs. It’s He who will direct our arms and bring us the victory. 
It’s He who will assist us. We all should throw away the image of the white men’s god who is 
so pitiless. Listen to the voice for liberty that sings in all our hearts.” (cf. in: 
www.margueritelaurent.com/campaigns/campaignone/presswork/freeprisoners.html#prayer, 
June 16, 2006) 
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elite, the military and economic establishment, reacted with a roll-back strategy. 
Only eight month later, Aristide, the legitimately elected leader, was ousted by a 
military coup on September 30, 1991.  
iii. Popular music, stimulated by a modern interpretation of vodun, was crucial in in-
stalling a subversive freedom culture, promoting democratic transition: There is a 
surprisingly strong relationship between popular Haitian music, power and politics. 
This was brought to the fore by the fascinating work of Gage Averill (1997), “A day 
for the hunter, a day for the prey”, which is likely to become a reference book on the 
subject matter. The ethnographically informed social history of the linkage between 
power politics, culture and pop music establishes four points beyond doubt: First, 
“Haitian politics and more generally the struggle for power have insinuated them-
selves into every arena of musical expression. Popular music, as a discursive terrain, 
is a site at which power is enacted, acknowledged, accommodated, signified, con-
tested, and resisted.” (cf. Averill 1997: preface, xi-xv). Second, just like in the realm of 
the political economy of religion, the instrumentalization of music in politics is 
highly ambiguous. It can and has been used both as tool to justify and camouflage 
despotic rule, like under the pretext of ‘noirisme’ by the Duvalier’s regime, as well as 
a means of fighting by the oppressed in their struggle for empowerment, as illus-
trated below in the case of the angaje (politically engaged) music of pop-groups like 
Boukman Eksperyans. Third, since the 1950s, the message, songs and rhythms of 
vodun have increasingly been incorporated into popular Haitian music, albeit not in 
an unchanged ‘traditional’, but an adapted way, corresponding to the actual social 
and political conditions as ‘high modernity’. Finally, the Haitian diaspora, forced 
into emigration by economic need or by political harassment, played a crucial part in 
creating a specific Haitian freedom culture (Kilti libète, in Creole) with their engag-
ing poetry, drama and music, linking ‘traditional’ peasant culture with progressive 
politics. The ‘unfinished migration’ of the slave trade, combined with continuing 
fluctuating migration of Haitians of all classes, due to different, often opposed eco-
nomic or political reasons, contributed to a dynamic and inspiring culture with an 
engaged poetry, drama and music, which had a profound impact on the essentially 
transnational composition of Haitian identity, including its intimate relationship to 
the West African vodun cosmology (cf. Averill 1997:161-207; Kuelker 1998).  
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iv. The pop-group Boukman Eksperyans is an outstanding example for such angaje mu-
sic. It formed part of the popular resistance movement Operasyon Dechoukaj39, 
which contributed to the fall of an autocratic regime. Like other popular activists of 
mizik rasin, or new roots-music, e.g. Manno Charlemagne, Boukan Ginen and the 
roots band Ram, they combined the liberating aspects of Haitian vodun, as repre-
sented by the legend about the vodun priest Boukman Dutty (see above), and visions 
of global syncretism of world religions, with demands for empowerment of the poor, 
elements of rara carnival, Afro-pop and American rock music. The band was 
founded by Lolo Beaubrun and his wife Mimerose in the late 1970s. Already from 
their political exile they effectively contributed to the empowerment of Aristide as 
president. Likewise, from the underground they took active part in the cultural revo-
lution which swept across the country in the late 1980s. Yet, later on they proved to 
be equally critical about human rights violations of the second Aristide government. 
Among their biggest success were ‘Voudou Adjae’, the first ever Haitian song nomi-
nated for a Grammy award, and the carnival song Kè m pa Sote (my heart doesn’t 
jump, I’m not afraid), which helped to bring down military dictatorship in 1990 and 
became the campaign song for Aristide’s successful election campaign. Kalfou dan-
jere (dangerous crossroads), composed in 1992 as comment on the military coup 
which ousted Aristide in 199140, became an international hit. It was listed in the 
World music charts and nominated for the Grammy award in 1992. This even en-
hanced the positive reception of the protest song among Haitian’s opposition. With 
the song the group prepared the floor for Aristide's return to power in 1994 (cf. 
McAlistar 2002; Averill 1997; Ewen 2003:11-13; Boukman Eksperyans 2004).  
 
The Brazilian African Diaspora – Empowerment of the Poor, Guided by Afro-Brazilian 
religion: The Candomblé and Quilombo Movement  
Brazil is the 5th most populous, and at the same time one of the most unequal countries in 
the world (Gini coefficient 0,61). People of African descent constitute about half of total 
population and still suffer under a long history of marginalization since the early days of the 
                                                     
39  Dechoukaj, or uprooting (the wrongdoing) in Creole, or mawonaj, meaning resistance, originally 
from slavery, currently from any form of oppression; the expression has the same roots as the Eng-
lish word Maroon.  
40  Translation of the Creole text of the song Kalfou danjere (dangerous crossroad) by Averill (1997:198-
199): “Liars, you’ll be in deep trouble / At the crossroads of the Congo people / O wou o, the cross-
roads of the Congo people / We’re not doing any killing / We’re not going to play that game … / 
Ginen is not Bizango”; i.e. Ginen vodun (of countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea, notably an-
cient Dahomey), as explained by Averill, is not one of other more violent secret cults; hereby the 
group underlined their peaceful approach of spiritual resistance.  
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slave trade. The Afro-Brazilian community (about 80 million) is renowned as the largest 
Nationality group of African descent next to Nigeria and the major group within the global 
African Diaspora. 
i. Racial marginalization in the aftermath of the slave trade was encountered by Afro-
Brazilians with recourse to their common African culture: Poverty has a racial face in 
Brazil, which was often denied by government sources and the power elite alike. 
Both favored the ideology of a Brazilian ‘racial democracy’ (cf. Hanchard 1998 for a 
critique). Black-headed households account for 64% of all poor people in Brazil ac-
cording to World Bank statistics. There were 35.5 million black against 19.6 million 
white people living in poverty in Brazil in 2001, and the racial divide is still growing 
(cf. World Bank 2002). The mean income in black-headed households is 42% of that 
in white-headed households (cf. Ferreira et al. 2003:73). The generation long resis-
tance of black people against oppression, inequality and marginalization was met 
with severe repression. The covert recourse to their common African cultural heri-
tage was their decisive strategy to circumvent the most brutal forms of repression, 
and at the same time to guarantee effectiveness and sustainability of resistance. This 
strategy shows interesting parallels to the Haitian example which should be followed 
up by future research in more detail. 
ii. The quilombo movement, candomblé and the Movimento Negro, backed by transna-
tional social spaces, were crucial arenas of Black empowerment  
iii. Since the early days of slavery up till now, the most crucial social space that allowed 
for black resistance was within the realm of religion, notably African religion, which 
the state and the church consequently were keen to suppress as a well (cf. Myatt 
1995:64-67). There are different denominations of vodun related forms of belief in 
Brazil, the most prominent of which is candomblé41. Closely linked to these religious 
social spaces of hidden resistance was the quilombo-movement42. It originated from 
settlements of runaway slaves and comprises black Afro-Brazilian communities 
formed on the basis of solidarity and their common belief. Afro-Brazilian religion later-
                                                     
41  According to official estimates there exist only three million believers (1.5% of total population) 
who officially declared candomblé as their religion. However, the official census is chronically bi-
ased and underestimated. Because of centuries of official persecution and criminalization of Afro-
Brazilian religion, many adherents do not want to expose their belief officially (cf. Prandi 2003). 
According to Afro-Brazilian organizations, about 70 million Brazilians, i.e. some 90% of the black 
population, participate in the service of candomblé or other Afro-Brazilian religions. There exist 
more than twelve thousand candomblé temples (called terreiros) in the country, alone 2,230 were 
registered in Salvador de Bahia.  
42  In the West African language Yoruba, ‘quilombo' means ‘housing’. Many slaves rebelled and con-
stituted quilombo communities as territories of housing, resistance and social organization. 
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on became closely linked to the négritude philosophy, imported by African intellec-
tuals who had studied in France and England, and to the Movimento Negro, emerg-
ing simultaneously in Brazil in the 1930s (cf. Myatt 1995:71, 109). In 2003 there were 
2,228 quilombos with about 30 million ha land and 2 million inhabitants all over the 
country (cf. UnB Agência 2005; Ministry of Agrarian Development 2005).  
iv. The resurgent Movimento Negro, basically a product of the black elite and progressive 
circles of the theology of liberation, became increasingly politicized in the 1980s, enter-
ing several of Brazil’s political parties (cf. Hanchard 1998:123-129; Myatt 1995:108). 
With its vigorous campaigns for the recognition of Afro-Brazilians' civic rights it con-
tributed significantly to the acknowledgment of the quilombos in Brazil's constitution 
in 1988, the year of the 100th commemoration of the slave liberation43. Within the Ro-
man Catholic Church the Movimento Negro became increasingly active in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, forming two groups which held a central place in the move-
ment: the Agentes de Pastoral Negro (Agents of the Black Pastoral, APN) and Grupo 
de União e Consciência Negra (Black Union and Conscience Group, GRUCON; cf. 
Myatt 1995:130). In accordance with the egalitarian message of the Movimento Negro, 
the APN was organized in four regional divisions, called quilombos, in allusion to 
their mundane counterparts. Some were organized by the diocese, others by cities, 
neighborhoods or other local or regional bodies (cf. Myatt 1995:152-155).  
v. Again the majority of members of APN belonged to the intellectual black elite. There-
fore, it is crucial to underline the bearing of social class and belonging on the capacity 
to mobilize black empowerment in Brazil (cf. Myatt 1995:155; Hanchard 1998:77-98). 
Even the encouragement of racial consciousness, which was certainly effectively done 
by the Movimento Negro, does not necessarily lead to corresponding political actions 
of the stakeholders. In this respect there is hardly any difference to the socio-structural 
divide between class consciousness and political resistance (cf. Hanchard 1998:160).  
vi. Black empowerment and the quilombo movement were obstructed by regional and 
local power elites in the cause of a global culture of progress. Despite the support of 
empowerment of the black poor by the black elite in Brazil and a vast transnational 
social network of cooperating local, national and international agencies, like Human 
Rights Organisations, the church, Brazilian universities, or even the Economic and 
                                                     
43  Although the Brazilian constitution of 1988 guarantees return of land titles to quilombolas 
(residents of quilombos), so far only 70 communities have had their lands regulated by the 
federal government. While local and state governments are also authorized to regularize 
lands, so far there has not been a single initiative to register quilombo lands at the local level 
(cf. de Oliveira 2005: Brazil: Waiting For Their Land of Freedom. November 20, 2005, in: 
www.boloji.com/wfs4/wfs493.htm, November 22, 2005). 
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Social Council of the United Nations, they were confronted with continuing or even 
growing resentment. The Brazilian state, notably on the regional level, and even 
more local power elites with hidden vested interest obstructed the quilombo move-
ment in the name of progress. A recent UN report on racial discrimination in Brazil 
revealed several examples of gross human and civic rights violations concerning the 
quilombistas (supporters of quilombos). It summarizes: “Their lives are in the hands 
of the landowners and farmers, and they feel as if they are still slaves, without any 
rights. Despite the 2003 Presidential decree recognizing their rights as citizens (nota-
bly their land-tenure rights, D.K.), the acts of violence against them have increased” 
(UN 2006:14-15). Apparently many municipalities or landowners preferred more 
profitable ‘modern’ investments, like tourism, urban development schemes or com-
mercial agriculture, and they obstruct access of the quilombos to land and basic 
amenities, often misusing funds meant for the development of the quilombos for 
other purposes. 
vii. Obstruction of candomblé by neo-Pentecostals, assisted by market oriented transna-
tional networks. Example of clash of cultures of innovation? Since the late 1970s, US-
dominated evangelist neo-Pentecostals promoted a ‘Holy war’ against Afro-Brazilian 
religions and attacked candomblé as incarnation of the devil, following the doubtful 
example of the Roman Catholic Church in colonial times. They were assisted by insti-
tutional racism of local or regional governments (cf. UN 2006; Prandi 2003:6; Jeffrey 
1997). The most notorious neo-Pentecostal was the Igreja Universal do Reino de 
Deus/Universal Church of the Reign of God (IURD), founded in 1978, which claimed 
3.5 million members in Brazil and maintained missions in 35 other countries (cf. Jef-
frey 1997). The church propagated a “theology of prosperity” in which individual 
money-making is considered as pleasantly to God. It was widely criticized for cor-
ruption, however, the enormous financial means of the globalized Pentecostals facili-
tate their campaigns. One example is their control over the media, acquired through 
heavy internationally backed investment and supported by the neo-liberal concepts 
of an “open markets ideology”, as propagated by the international donor community 
(cf. Jeffrey 1997)44. In addition the Pentecostals threatened priests of the candomblé 
                                                     
44  Cf. Jeffrey 1997: “…Paulo Ayres Mattos, the Methodist bishop of Recife, says the way new reli-
gious movements like the IURD use the media illustrates how ‘the religion of the market is tri-
umphing’. Ayres claims that defining neo-Pentecostalism in Brazil is ‘to talk about something 
that’s as much a media phenomenon as a religious phenomenon. It’s a product of the media, of 
marketing, of religious businesses appealing to 30 million evangelical consumers’. …For Ayres 
and many other observers, a significant element of evangelical church growth in Brazil reflects the 
conversion of religion into a commodity.” 
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temples (terreiros), assaulted their worshippers and financed aggressive campaigns 
of conversion aimed at adherents of Afro-Brazilian religions. This led among others 
to the discrimination of school children and adults who dared to confess their relig-
ion. State agencies did not intervene against this religious intolerance and open ra-
cism, on the contrary the police often assisted in the aggression (cf. UN 2006: No. 46). 
 
 
4. Potential of Indigenous Cultures of Innovation in Times of Glocalization  
Enlarging the range of choice by promoting stimuli for innovative actors and by improving 
the competition of cultures and ideas is an important means of promoting development. 
However, we have to give due regard to the serious problem of asymmetric power relations 
in a globalized world (cf. Sen 2002:18-19). The hubris of the high modernist ideology (Scott 
1998), still propagated by Western and African experts alike (cf. Kohnert 1995 for a critical 
evaluation), is not only tainted by the dangers of euro-centrism and top-down approaches. It 
also diverts attention from exploring the potential of indigenous cultural innovations, and 
worst of all, it tends to undermine the informal social and economic structures of indigenous 
cultures, the ground on which local innovations might otherwise flourish.  
In general, cultures of innovation are, beyond any doubt, powerful stimuli for agents of 
change. However, awareness does not necessarily lead to political action, and not all cul-
tures of innovation in the informal sector have positive effects on the fate of the poor. In or-
der to have a sustainable positive impact, they must be embedded in a development enhanc-
ing social structure. Notably their articulation with social stratification and gender is crucial 
for the outcome of the innovation process. In this respect, there are still more open questions 
than answers. For example, future, more detailed studies should explore the reasons for the 
apparent discrepancy between the successful political grass-roots movements inspired by 
vodun in Benin or Haiti, and the rather elitist Movimento Negro analyzed above. 
Indigenous cultural innovations (as defined above) are c.p. more suited to promote sustain-
able development than externally induced innovations with questionable potential of adap-
tation, notably if they are reduced to one-dimensional categorizations and identities (cf. the 
sharp critique of such approaches by Sen 2006).  
Transnational social networks play an increasing role in promoting the interaction of cultures 
and in transmitting cultural innovations into the informal sector which might be more readily 
adapted than innovations imposed by official aid or formal institutions. The impact of pluri-
local social spaces on the interactive process of cultural change and on the diffusion of innova-
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tions in the informal sector is not restricted to the educated elite. It concerns different social 
strata on macro, meso and micro levels, as shown above in comparative case studies. 
It is open to debate, whether the process of commercialization of social relations promoted 
by globalization, and the accompanying spread of venality, violence, and criminalization of 
African states and societies affects cultural change and economic development positively or 
negatively. Examples of commercialization of religion by neo-Pentecoastals, like in the 
above case of Brazil, certainly are to be considered as barriers to human development. But 
notwithstanding justified general human rights concerns or individual value judgments, the 
culture of commercialization of social relations might under certain conditions objectively 
contribute to the process of primary accumulation45. 
To put it in a nutshell, the globalized western culture of innovation, as propagated by major 
aid institutions, does not necessarily lead to empowerment or improvement of the well-
being of the stakeholders. On the contrary, it often blocks viable indigenous innovation cul-
tures. However, the latter are not per se the better alternatives. All depends on their em-
beddedness in development oriented social structures. 
                                                     
45  On different, sometimes contradictory explanations of growing markets of violence in Africa and its 
impact on development, as well as on divergences enhanced by cleavages between different aca-
demic disciplines, cf. Richards/Vlassenroot (2002). They propose a sociological concept based on 
theories of solidarity and labor division vs. a utilitarian economic concept as presented by Collier 
2000a or Addison et al. 2002. For discussions on the concept of markets of violence cf. in addition 
Elwert et al. 1999. – For a critical review of the debate on the role of primary accumulation in capital-
ist development and the articulation of modes of production in Africa cf. Kohnert 1982:62-241. 
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